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ing changes that have been made over time and attempted reform
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Election season is within sight again, and with it come theobligatory attacks on the judiciary.  Some call it simplycampaigning or electioneering, while others believe it is
more serious and a form of “judge bashing.”  Whatever name
the problems are given, the entire election process may have a
marked effect on the independence of our judiciary, as well as
the ethics of judges and judicial candidates.  And in the end,
because these problems affect the public’s faith in the judicial
system, they must be addressed.
Most of the literature concerning an independent judiciary
centers on the several federal judges of the United States, with
little discussion about state court judges.  Yet the American
public is much more affected in its daily life by the results of
state court judicial decisions than opinions from the federal
judiciary.  The majority of jury trials in Florida take place in its
twenty circuit courts, which have 527 judgeships and also hear
appeals from county court cases.1 In total, 97% of all litigation
in the United States is handled by state courts.2
Similar to problems plaguing the federal judicial system,
much of the harshest recent criticism of judges has been
directed at state jurists for issuing opinions at odds with the
majority will in a variety of contexts.  A California trial judge
reported on the prevalence of criticism of California judges,
and discussed a protocol initiated by the California Judges
Association: when such inaccurate and unfair criticism occurs,
selected judges stand ready to assist in offering a rapid
response for publication or broadcast.3 There is some under-
standable concern as to the propriety and desirability of judges
defending decisions of their brethren in the media. Effective
response mechanisms must be developed that involve not only
the bench, but also the bar and public, in a coordinated effort. 
In state courts, judges are either appointed or elected for a
specific initial term, and then up for retention or reelection by
the voters, or reappointment by the governor or state legisla-
ture, for additional terms in office.  As shown in the accompa-
nying chart, most state court judges stand for some form of
contestable election—and almost 90% of general jurisdiction
trial judges go through a contestable election to gain a second
term in office.
Florida has a three-tier judicial system: a trial level, consist-
ing of the County Court, which is a court of limited jurisdic-
tion (one county court in each of the 67 counties in Florida)
and the Circuit Court, a general jurisdiction court (there are 20
geographic circuit courts in Florida); an appellate level, the
District Court of Appeals (there are 5 geographic district
courts of appeals in Florida); and one Florida Supreme Court.
Florida is among the states in which judges of the trial courts
are initially appointed by governor (when there is a vacancy or
a new judicial seat created by the legislature), after recommen-
dations from the governor-appointed judicial nominating com-
mittees, and then judges must stand for election, and may face
opposition in a nonpartisan vote.  The judges and justices of
the appellate and supreme courts, respectively, are initially
appointed by governor after recommendations from the
appointed judicial nominating committees, and then the
judges and justices must run for “merit” retention, without an
opposing candidate.4
In total, state judges are subject to election, reelection, or
retention election in 38 states.5 In 2001, the Florida
Legislature revised the statute relating to the appointment of
members of the state’s judicial nominating commissions. Prior
to the change, the Florida Bar appointed three lawyer mem-
bers, the governor appointed three members who could be
either lawyers or nonlawyers, and those six commission mem-
bers selected three nonlawyer members. Under the revision,
the governor now appoints all nine members of each commis-
sion. Four of the lawyer members must be appointed from lists
of nominees submitted by the Florida Bar.  The law also
requires the governor to consider racial, ethnic, and gender
diversity, as well as geographic distribution, when making
appointments to the commission.
This reform of the Florida judicial nominating commissions
by the legislature further politicized the judicial election
process. In addition to the appointment, election, and
impeachment processes, states have their own judicial stan-
dards and monitoring bodies, such as Florida’s Judicial
Qualifications Committee (JQC), an administrative agency
that investigates judicial misconduct and recommends to the
Some Thoughts on the
Problems of Judicial Elections
Jeffrey Rosinek
20 Court Review - Summer 2004
 
6. 867 So.2d 379 (2004).
7. Id. at 383.
8. Id. at 381-82.
9. Id. at 382.
10. Id. at 383.
11. Jeffrey Rosinek, Political Pressure on an Independent Judiciary,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997.
12. ABA JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at § 5.
However, the ABA Commission warned that “opinions [of bar
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Florida Supreme Court the level of pun-
ishment believed warranted for each
infraction.  The Supreme Court then
determines the degree of discipline, which
may range from private reprimand to
removal from the bench. 
In a recent decision, In re Angel,6 the
Florida Supreme Court noted  “conduct
related to partisan political functions
[that] violated both the spirit and the let-
ter of … the Florida Statutes and Canon 7
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”7 In
Angel, the judge and his family had
actively campaigned at a number of parti-
san political gatherings, holding the judge
out as a member of a political party in a
nonpartisan election; his opponent was
not invited to these political events.8
Canon 7, as adopted in Florida, specifi-
cally forbids a judge from attending parti-
san political events outside of the cam-
paign season; even then, the judge may
not appear unless other candidates are
invited and may address only matters
relating to the law, improvement of the
legal system, and the administration of
justice.9 The court issued a public repri-
mand of Judge Angel, but warned that
more severe sanctions may be levied for partisan activity by
judges: “Certainly, in very egregious cases, where a judge’s mis-
conduct included implications that he or she would make par-
tisan decisions on the bench, the JQC has recommended a sub-
stantial fine in addition to public reprimand and even
removal.”10
The balance of powers, delicately established over two cen-
turies ago, is destroyed when our political leaders attack judges
and judicial decisions, without just cause, in order to play pol-
itics.  As I have written previously, “a vicious assault on the
independence of the judiciary is a direct attack on the viability
of our government . . . .  It is the public’s faith in the system of
an impartial, independent judicial branch of government that
embodies a constitutional law-abiding citizenry.  Uncalled-for
and unjustified political attacks on the independence of the
judiciary defeat that concept so long enjoyed and cherished.”11
In Ancient Roman times, Juvenal wrote, “Sed quis custodiet
ipsos custodies”— “Who watches the watchmen?”  This ques-
tion is equally relevant and appropriate in modern times, when
allegations of undue influence by political and financial bene-
factors may arise, often due to the very election process.  The
American Bar Association’s Commission on Separation of
Powers and Judicial Independence circulated a list of questions
to 245 state and local bar leaders and got 93 responses, listing
the top factors that threatened judicial independence in their
states: (1) judicial independence is being eroded by excessive
criticism of judges for issuing opinions at odds with the major-
ity will in a variety of contexts; (2) judicial reelection is too
politicized; (3) judicial selection is too politicized; and (4)
judges are too dependent on campaign contributions.12
It is the need to raise funds for costly campaigns that ini-
tially brings the notion of judicial independence into ques-
tion to begin with, for a number of reasons.  Organizing a judi-
cial campaign has become very expensive.  Judges must raise
funds from a variety of outside sources in amounts that, only a
few years ago, were unthinkable.  The use of advertising on
radio and television and in print media has skyrocketed. In a
growing number of states, television advertising—by candi-
dates and supportive special interests—is becoming the key to
getting elected to America’s state supreme courts. Ads ran in
64% of the states with contested races in 2002, compared to
less than a quarter of such states in 2000.13 An increasing per-
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SELECTION AND RETENTION SYSTEMS FOR STATE COURT JUDGES
APPELLATE COURTS
Total appellate judges: 1,243
Total that stand for some form of election: 1,084 (87%)
Total that stand for contestable election: 659 (53%)
INITIAL TERM SUBSEQUENT TERMS
Appointment: 582 (47%) Appointment: 133 (11%)
Partisan Election:  495 (40%) Partisan Election: 400 (32%)
Nonpartisan Election: 166 (13%) Nonpartisan Election: 166 (13%)
Retention Election: 518 (43%)
GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS
Total trial judges: 8,489
Total that stand for some form of election: 7,378 (87%)
Total that stand for contestable election: 6,650 (77%)
INITIAL TERM SUBSEQUENT TERMS
Appointment: 2,061 (24%) Appointment: 1,013 (12%)
Partisan Election:  3,669 (43%) Partisan Election: 2,360 (28%)
Nonpartisan Election: 2,759 (33%) Nonpartisan Election: 2,891 (35%)
Retention Election: 2,127 (25%)
Source: Report and Recommendations of the [ABA] Task Force on Lawyers’ Political Contributions, Part Two, July 1998, at 69, 73.
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centage of candidates in con-
tested races are buying ads, and
the number of special interests
buying airtime has doubled in
just two years. Altogether, in
America’s 100 largest media mar-
kets, candidates and interest
groups spent almost $8.3 million
on television airtime in 2002.14
Judicial campaigns are pressured
into hiring public relations firms
to handle all the advertising
needs.  In some cases, these pub-
lic relations firms and political
consultants notify judges that
though they have other potential
judicial candidates, these candidates will not run against any
judge who hires their firm—arguably analogous to extortion,
yet carried out like business as usual.  And business costs
money, so the need for candidates to raise funds for successful
campaigns is greater than ever.  Typically, incumbent judges in
Miami-Dade County do not draw opposition because of the
perception that they have status, name recognition, and money,
but judges are kept in suspense up to the very last minute as to
whether they will run unopposed or be faced with new chal-
lengers in an expensive election campaign.15
Unfortunately, this creates a perception that candidates are
beholden to their financial benefactors, be they wealthy indi-
viduals, attorneys who try cases before them, special interest
groups, or entire community demographic groups.  No matter
how ethical judges may be, that perception definitely affects
the public’s view of judges, particularly shaping how it will
vote.  In a national survey of state judges in late 2001, 60% of
Florida state judges said that the conduct and tone of judicial
campaigns had gotten worse over the past five years.16 Thirty
percent of the state judges in Florida believed that campaign
contributions made to judges had at least some influence on
their decisions, and 68% were concerned that “there are few
restrictions on special interest groups who buy advertising to
influence the outcomes of judicial elections and decisions.”17
(Nationally, the percentage was similar: 62%.)18
Interest group television campaigns are rapidly spreading.
Just a few years ago, special interest ads were unheard of in
judicial elections. But in 2002, special interests and political
parties ran ads in more than twice as many states as in 2000.19
Judges and judicial candidates are always pressured to speak
on current issues, such as the death penalty and abortion,
which the Code of Judicial Conduct generally bars them from
commenting on publicly.20 There is always pressure to com-
ment on current issues, which causes judges great concern.
Ninety-six percent of Florida state judges favor a proposal that
ensures “judicial candidates should never make promises dur-
ing elections about how they will rule in future cases that may
come before them.”21 That proposal is already the rule under
the present Code of Judicial Conduct as adopted in Florida.22
Canon 7A(3)(d)(i) in Florida provides that judges or judicial
candidates shall not “make pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office.” Subsection (d)(ii) in Florida provides that
judges or judicial candidates shall not “make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court.” Although the United States Supreme Court in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White23 found Minnesota’s
Code of Judicial Conduct provision forbidding judges from
“announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues” too broad to withstand constitutional challenge, the
Florida Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
these Florida provisions after White.24 It found that these
canons, as adopted in Florida, were more narrowly tailored
than the broad “announce” clause at issue in White and that the
Florida provisions satisfied a compelling state interest in main-
taining public confidence in an impartial judiciary; thus, the
Florida provisions withstood a First Amendment challenge.25
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If the Florida interpretation of White is eventually con-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court, this should dis-
suade candidates from making statements that commit or
appear to commit them with respect to issues, cases, and con-
troversies likely to come before the court.  Even so, as a prac-
tical matter, judges may be attacked not only by candidates,
who are subject to these restrictions, but also by third parties,
who are not.  Once attacked, judges are fearful about defend-
ing themselves against attacks, lest they disqualify themselves
from handling the very issues in question later, should those
issues come before the bench. 
Sixty-eight percent of Florida judges are very concerned
that “because voters have little information about judicial can-
didates, judges are often selected for reasons other than their
qualifications.”26 As one reporter recently summarized the sit-
uation, “Experts who study judicial elections say voters know
little about the people who preside over the legal system and
considerably less about whether they are doing a good job.”27
The 2004 circuit judge election in Miami-Dade County,
Florida (the 11th Circuit), the largest of Florida’s judicial cir-
cuits, illustrates some of these concerns perfectly.  Data on can-
didate contributions is available through the Florida Secretary
of State’s  campaign financing database.28 As of October 2,
2004, online data showed candidates in contested races had
raised a maximum of $360,556 (John Schlesinger, running
against Teresa M. Pooler, who raised $111,837) and as little as
$27,400 (William L. Thomas, running for an open seat against
three other candidates, one of whom, Catherine B. Parks, had
raised $115,863).  Sixteen candidates for the 11th Circuit (out
of a total of 26 candidates) raised over $100,000, and only two
candidates were incumbents defending against challengers: D.
Bruce Levy, who raised $184,484 (running against Barbara
Areces, who raised $223,209), and Henry H. Harnage, who
raised  $251,278 (running against Peter Adrien, who raised
$59,594).  John Schlesinger holds the 2004 record for cam-
paign contributions raised for all candidates in all of Florida’s
circuits, followed by Henry Harnage, also of the 11th Circuit,
with the second-highest amount in the state. 
In 2002, the estimated population of the 11th Judicial
Circuit was 2,332,559. In recent years, the cost to reach the
voters has skyrocketed. To run a competitive campaign in
Miami-Dade County, scores of thousands of dollars must be
raised, with much of it coming from the practicing bar. These
figures suggest that true judicial independence may be a thing
of the past, or called into question at the very least, with such
large amounts of funds raised
for campaigning.  
The judicial election took
place on August 31, 2004.
There were only three judicial
incumbents, two circuit judges
and one county court judge,
who were challenged. All three
were defeated. The man who
raised the most money, John
Schlesinger, won handily.29 But
the overall victors were the
public relations people, who
walked away from the election financial victors, no matter
which judicial candidate was elected.
A different situation exists in smaller counties, such as Polk,
a county in west central Florida.  There, as a local newspaper
reporter put it, “lawyers may be hesitant to challenge incum-
bent judges for fear of reprisals. Hence, most judges are unop-
posed. In bigger cities—especially in states where judicial races
are partisan contests—judicial elections can turn into highly
charged, bare-knuckled brawls.”30 Daniel Foley, an associate
professor of journalism at the University of Tennessee who
studies courts and criminal justice put it this way:  “There’s no
good way to elect judges. What we need to do is find the least
bad way to elect them.”31
In the end, how can the tensions between judicial indepen-
dence and elections be resolved?  One idea to create a greater
degree of judicial independence is to lengthen the terms judges
serve.  This would make the positions more attractive to draw
and keep the best judges, and it would reduce the number of
campaigns and the need for fundraising.    Of course, many
contend that the best solution is for all states to appoint their
judges on a merit-based system, to alleviate even more prob-
lems associated with fundraising for costly campaigns.  Most
states that appoint their judges, including Florida’s appellate
and supreme court judges, still subject them to run in reten-
tion elections (in which judges run unopposed), making
fundraising not as big an issue. While this process could create
a new set of issues, such as when governors appoint judges and
politics and party affiliations get involved, the system seems
preferable to hard-fought and expensive judicial elections.  
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility recently proposed amendments to the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which would state the ABA’s preference for
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merit-based selection.32 A relatively new provision of the ABA’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(e),provides fr juicial disqfication  instaeswheethejugmy vdmagnctbutonsfm  ltirantoy33 suggests
that campaign contributions made by attorneys or others who
appear before the judge may raise questions about the judge’s
impartiality, depending on the source and size of such contri-
butions.34 Such contributions could be cause for disqualifying
the recipients, perhaps a necessary deterrent to halt the appear-
ance of judicial impropriety.  
In the meantime, Florida residents voted in 2000 to keep
electing their circuit and county judges rather than having
them retained on a merit basis, so there is still strong public
support, at least in Florida, for some election procedures.35 It
is ironic that the appointment process is credited with making
the judiciary more diverse, yet several groups representing a
variety of minority attorneys wanted to keep elections. The
National Bar Association, the Hispanic Bar Association, the
Cuban-American Bar Association, and the Florida Association
for Women Lawyers all supported the current system of  elec-
tions, while the Florida Bar and the American Bar Association
spent about $70,000 lobbying for the change to a merit-based
system of retention.36
The Florida proposal for merit selection and retention was
overwhelmingly rejected in every county. The average affirma-
tive vote (in favor of merit-based retention) was only 32%;
two-thirds of Floridians preferred electing their judiciary.
Despite public debates and support for retention procedures
from a variety of interest groups (including the Florida Bar), it
looks like the election process will not be ending any time
soon.  What judges and judicial candidates do to campaign for
these positions will continue to have a great impact on the
public’s trust in its judiciary.
Jeffrey Rosinek is a circuit court judge in
Florida’s 11th Judicial Circuit, where he has
served as a judge for 18 years.  Since 1999, he
has been in charge of the Miami-Dade Drug
Court and the associate administrator of the
Appellate Division of the 11th Judicial Circuit.
Rosinek is a former president of American
Judges Association and chairs the Florida
Association of Drug Court Professionals.  He received both his
undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Miami.
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Those who want the judges to be
social activists.  Those who find it easier
to change the law via the court system
than through legislative channels.  Judges
themselves who believe that they under-
stand what social change is needed better
than the makers of the law.
Some judges will discover social
changes in the Constitution that never
existed before.  Some judges simply
believe they are not controlled by the
Constitution and law made pursuant to it
if they determine that a socially desirable
result is necessary and is justified.  If this
be the case, why have a constitution?
Why go to the trouble of having the
Constitution amended?  Why have a leg-
islature make the law?  No one will know
the law until it is pronounced by some
court.  How are people to behave and
how are they to conduct business in such
an uncertain climate?  Obviously, it
becomes impossible.
Judges must judge cases by applying
and interpreting the law.  This is their
proper function as set forth in the
Constitution.  There is room for different
interpretation of the law, but there must
be an effort by every judge to uphold the
law, as the oath he takes upon taking the
bench requires.  He must be impartial
and lay aside any preconceived notions as
to what the law ought to be.  The court
must consider the cases before it in a fair
and thorough manner, and decide it in as
expeditious a manner as possible.  To do
otherwise is to demean the judiciary and
the litigants before it.
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